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Feature Article 
THE BP BID FOR BRITOIL: SHOULD SCOTLAND TAKE I T LYING DOHN? 
John Scouller, Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
" I t also shows....both the retent ion and 
the l o c a t i o n of the headquar te r s of 
impor tan t B r i t i s h companies here in 
Scotland i s not only feas ib le but highly 
desirable and one which I think we can al l 
take pretty great pleasure in". 
(The Right Honourable Malcolm Rifkind MP 
at the opening of Britoil 's HQ) 
process? This ar t icle discusses the issue 
in the context of the recent BP bid for 
B r i t o i l . For a more detai led analyt ical 
study see Ashcroft, Love and Scouller 
(1987). 
Britoil 
The BP bid for the Glasgow based Br i to i l 
represents another example of an important 
but relatively unrecognised trend over the 
past twenty-five years : the decline in 
the number of independent S c o t t i s h 
companies as a result of takeover by non-
Scottish companies. Since the mid-1960's 
several hundred independent "Scottish" 
companies have been acquired by non-
Scott ish companies amongst them many 
famous names: Templeton, Arrol, Glenlivet, 
B e l l s , Teachers , Coats Paton, Sui ts , 
Anderson Strathclyde, Barr and Stroud, 
Gourock Ropes and Cochran. When we add to 
this l i s t those Scottish companies which 
l o s t t he i r independence as a r e su l t of 
nationalisation i t becomes apparent that 
in addit ion to becoming a branch-plant 
economy since the 1960's, Scotland has 
also become a branch-office economy and 
that the Scott ishness of large par t s of 
S c o t t i s h indus t ry i s now so l e ly a 
geographic concept rather than one based 
on the location of the controllers. 
Many questions arise from this process of 
de-Scot t i sh isa t ion . How can the process 
go before the idea of a d i s t i n c t l y 
Scottish industrial base becomes a fading 
memory? Has this process been damaging to 
the Scott ish economy? Should something 
(such as automatic reference of such cases 
to the MMC) must be done about t h i s 
B r i t o i l i s one of B r i t a i n ' s l a r g e s t 
companies and i s one of the few remaining 
"Scottish" indust r ia l companies of any 
significance. I t i s an independent o i l 
and gas exploration and production company 
and the largest such company in the world 
not already part of the oil majors such as 
Exxon, Texaco and BP. The company was 
formed in 1982 from the asse ts of the 
publicly owned BNOC which had been set up 
in the mid-1970's by the then Labour 
government to ensure a major Br i t i sh 
presence in North Sea oi l exploration 
independent from the world o i l majors. 
The company was privat ised in l a t e 1982 
(half) and 1985 (half) but the government 
retained a so-called "golden share" to 
prevent any change in control of the 
company tha t was f e l t to be against the 
public i n t e r e s t . Br i to i l i s now the 
fourth largest oil and gas producer in the 
North Sea behind Shell, Esso (the British 
arm of the US giant Exxon) and BP, and i t 
i s the major owner of North Sea Oil 
l i c e n c e s . I t has i t s p r e s t i g i o u s 
h e a d q u a r t e r s in Glasgow, a l a r g e 
operations base in Aberdeen, i t operates 
the Nigg Oil terminal in the Cromarty 
Fi r th , four oi l f ie lds in the North Sea, 
has an i n t e r e s t in seven others, and i s 
currently developing six more fields. I t 
also has explorations underway in thirteen 
o ther c o u n t i r e s inc luding Egypt and 
Indonesia. I t s intention i s to develop 
into an independent world exploration and 
production company which because i t will 
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not be encumbered by the huge downstream 
operations of the oi l majors should be 
more a b l e t o e x p l o i t a v a i l a b l e 
opportunities. 
BPs motivation 
In some respects the timing of BP's bid 
for Britoil seems to be perverse. The bid 
came a t a time when as a resu l t of the 
stock-market crash of October 1987 the BP 
privatisation share issue had flopped and 
the BP s h a r e p r i c e was l o o k i n g 
par t icular ly weak. In addition BP had 
only r ecen t ly completed a major US 
acquisi t ion, a t great expense to i t s 
financial health in view of the rapidly 
fal l ing dol lar , and the world oi l price 
was in the doldrums. Hardly the time, one 
might have t h o u g h t , to l aunch a 
controversial takeover bid for a company 
which the government had clearly signalled 
was not up for grabs by providing i t with 
i t s "golden share". Why then did BP make 
the bid? 
A good case could be put for the claim 
that BP was acting from a mixture of 
anxiety and opportunism in making the bid 
for Br i to i l . F i r s t , as a resu l t of the 
fa i lure of the pr iva t i sa t ion issue in 
October and the sudden build up of shares 
in the hands of the Kuwaiti Investment 
Office (now approaching 20%) BP i tself was 
fee l ing vu lne rab le . At one time a 
takeover bid for a company of BP's size 
was inconceivable but in recent years many 
very large companies in Bri tain (IMPS, 
D i s t i l l e r s ) and in the US have been 
acquired and sheer size i s no longer a 
guarantee aga in s t takeover . Buying 
Britoil, which would increase BP's market 
value by about 15%, would make i t somewhat 
l ess vulnerable to a bidder and the debt 
i t has to take on to make the purchase 
somewhat less attractive (This i s commonly 
ca l l ed the " p o i s o n - p i l l " t a c t i c in 
takeover c i rc les ) . 
Second, at current stock market values (BP 
are offering £5.00 per share) BP wil l be 
buying B r i t o l l ' s r e se rves , which are 
considerable, a t well below i t s long run 
market value and well below what i t would 
c o s t BP to f ind such r e s e r v e s by 
exploration and development. Britoil are 
claiming that a t ruer ref lect ion of the 
worth of their reserves would be about £7 
per share. I t i s a widely accepted view 
in the o i l indus t ry t h a t BP has a 
declining reserve profile because many of 
i t s major o i l f i e lds are now past the i r 
peak. Br i to i l on the other hand has a 
remarkably healthy reserve profile because 
i t s best f ie lds are s t i l l below peak 
production levels. In this sense Britoil 
i s a l o t more important to BP than BP can 
be to Br i t o i l , even if one accepted BP's 
arguments tha t Br i to i l needs BP cash to 
enable i t to exploit the full potential of 
i t s fields. 
Third, since there i s nothing obvious that 
BP can do for Br i t o i l , managerially, 
technically or f inancial ly, the benefits 
of a takeover wi l l accrue solely to BP. 
This is an important issue for reasons to 
be explained later. 
The government's golden share 
A complicating factor in the bid story so 
far has been the ex is tence of the 
government's golden share in Britoil which 
was intended to give the government a de 
facto veto on potent ia l acquirers by de jure preventing anyone from achieving 
to t a l control of the Br i to i l board. I t 
was f e l t tha t if a bidder could not be 
guaranteeed full control of the company's 
board i t would not want to bid for the 
company. BP have shown t h i s to be 
unfounded and so in a sense are cal l ing 
the government's bluff. 
One might ask why the government has not 
reacted more strongly than i t has done to 
BP's snub. In a s imilar s i tuat ion in 
1984, when RTZ bid for the newly 
privatised Enterprise Oil, the government 
simply told RTZ to back off and since RTZ 
had a number of important contracts with 
the government i t did so. Why, if the 
government i s serious about Br i to i l s ' s 
independence, has i t not put any overt 
pressure on BP? The government has not 
even indicated that i t would refer the 
merger to the MMC which is surely the 
l ea s t i t could do in the circumstances. 
Does the governemnt feel that i t owes BP a 
favour af ter the p r i v a t i s a t i o n i ssue 
collapse allowed the Kuwaiti Investment 
Office to build up i t s key stake in BP? 
Or does the government feel that BP's bid 
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makes sense in terms of ra t iona l i s ing 
Britain's oil industry? 
Competition policy considerations 
Grounds for reference to the MMC would not 
be hard to find if the government was 
looking. BP's bid easi ly meets the asset 
c r i t e r i a for a reference because the bid 
involves the acquisi t ion of assets in 
excess of £30m. The market share 
criterion i s a bit less clear cut because 
although the bid, i f successful, would 
take BP's share of North Sea oi l and gas 
p r o d u c t i o n above 25%, and would 
t e c h n i c a l l y make i t a monopol i s t i c 
supplier of North Sea o i l and gas, BP 
would no doubt argue that North Sea o i l 
and gas i s not a commodity which i s 
distinct in any way from oil and gas from 
elsewhere. Looked at in an international 
context, therefore, BP's acquisi t ion of 
Br i t o i l would not, i t could be argued, 
effectively reduce competition in the oil 
industry. 
However, the government may choose to 
recognise the fact tha t B r i t o i l i s the 
only independent o i l company of any 
significance which acts as competition for 
the oil majors such as BP, Shell and Esso. 
Any increase in the power of these o i l 
majors i s surely suspect on competition 
grounds and i s therefore worthy of a 
reference to the MMC. 
Of course the Office of Fair Trading could 
propose a reference of the merger to the 
MMC on regional grounds if i t seemed 
l ike ly tha t the merger would lead to "a 
significant decrease in employment" but BP 
seems to have convinced everyone that this 
i s unlikely and have thus made a reference 
on these grounds unlikely. 
(Comments by the MMC on previous mergers 
involving a strong Scottish interest are 
given in Appendix 1) 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of B r i t o i l to the 
Scottish economy 
B r i t o i l was r a t ed as the l a r g e s t 
independent company in Scotland in 1985, 
and the f i f th l a rges t in 1986, according 
to Scottish Business Insider tabulat ions. 
B r i t o i l ' s significance to Scotland cannot 
be underestimated. 
F i r s t , i t i s one of the dying breed of 
independent "Scottish" firms ( ie firms 
located in, registered in, and controlled 
from Scotland) although one might argue 
about j u s t how "Scottish" Br i to i l real ly 
i s . (The fact tha t a l l the key board 
meetings during the current bid situation 
are being held in London does make one 
wonder). Over the past 20 years many 
prominent Scottish firms have l o s t the i r 
independence as a result of takeover from 
ou t s ide Scot land. The process has 
resulted in a s i tua t ion where there are 
very few companies of any significance in 
Bri ta in, outside of the financial sector 
where Scottish firms are s t i l l important, 
which can be considered to be d i s t i nc t l y 
Scottish. The largest, after Britoil are 
Scottish and Newcastle Breweries, Dawson 
International, John Menzies and Christian 
Salvesen. This means that there are fewer 
and fewer centres of decision making power 
l e f t in Scotland and tha t an increasing 
number of d e c i s i o n s about S c o t t i s h 
industry are taken outside Scotland and 
are thus unlikely to re f l ec t Scott ish 
interests . 
If Scotland co t inues to l o s e these 
important centres of decision-making power 
i t wil l lose (quite apart from the direct 
economic losses) the abili ty to influence 
i t s own future and thus will be unable, as 
the government has recently suggested, to 
undertake i t own regeneration and not wait 
for handouts from Whitehall. 
Second, the ex i s t ence of B r i t o i l in 
Glasgow, through the jobs i t provides, the 
services i t requires , and i t s community 
involvement, make an important economic 
and social contribution to the local 
economy and society. 
Of major importance in this respect is the 
f a c t t h a t because B r i t o i l i s a 
headquarters operation i t s significance to 
the local economy and society goes beyond 
the number of employees in B r i t o i l . 
Because i t i s the headquarters of a major 
independent oi l company i t employs an 
above-average number of highly-skilled and 
thus highly paid individuals. Indeed the 
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wage b i l l per employee i s amongst the 
highest in Scotland (see Scottish Business 
Insider, January 1987) and around double 
the average level. This suggests that the 
loss of jobs from a company l ike Br i to i l 
i s of double the significance to the local 
economy of an average job loss. 
In a major study of the impact of Britoil 
on the local economy carried out by the 
Fraser of Allander Insti tute i t was found 
that when account was taken of the incomes 
paid to Britoil employees and the services 
purchased by B r i t o i l from the l o c a l 
economy, (such as financial services, 
l e g a l s e r v i c e s , t r a n s p o r t s e r v i c e s , 
cleaning services, u t i l t i t i e s and so on) 
that Britoil created almost 2,000 jobs in 
Scotland apart from i ts own Glasgow based 
workforce, which at the time of the study 
in 1985 stood at 1,548. (I t has since been 
reduced substantially due to the oil price 
collapse). 
The point i s , therefore that Britoil is of 
much greater significance to the Scottish 
economy than a simple head-count of 
employees would suggest and that any 
reduction of i t s operation in Glasgow 
would have an important multiplier effect 
on the Scottish economy in general. 
A further important consideration i s the 
highly-ski l led nature of employment a t 
Britoil. Because of the declining number 
of companies headquartered in Scotland, 
Scotland has a below average number of 
s k i l l e d managerial p o s i t i o n s whose 
ho lde r s , apa r t from t h e i r economic 
influece in the local community, might be 
expected to provide business and social 
leadership. The declining number of top 
managerial posts in Scotland seriously 
biases the social structure and ultimately 
influences such things as the education 
system and business dynamism. If the 
number of such people located in Scotland 
was to f a l l below a c r i t i c a l level i t 
would undoubtedly damage Scot land ' s 
industrial position. One suspects we are 
currently past the cr i t ical level already. 
BP has recognised the importance of the 
Scottish dimension of i t s bid for Britoil 
and has moved quickly to assure the 
Scottish media that i t s acqusition of 
Br i to i l would not involve any net job 
losses in Scotland. BP has stated that i t 
would des igna te Glasgow as i t s UK 
h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r e x p l o r a t i o n and 
production in and from the North Sea. 
From the Scottish point of view there are 
several problems with this statement. 
F i r s t , i t has no legal s ta tus and BP i s 
unlikely to give i t one unless the bid was 
referred to the MMC and BP were to give 
guarantees to the MMC on jobs in Scotland 
as part of an agreement allowing the bid 
to proceed. However, we should remember 
that Lonrho gave the MMC a promise that 
SUITS would remain as an autonomus 
S c o t t i s h subs id i a ry i f a merger was 
allowed. After a few years Lonrho took 
d i rec t control of the various parts of 
SUITS and the once important holding 
company was reduced to a mere shell and 
i t s head office in Glasgow closed. The 
MMC does not appear to have noted th i s 
change of heart. 
Second, i t has to be recognised that 
softening the Scott ish lobby i s a normal 
part of the game for companies making an 
acquisi t ion in Scotland from outs ide 
Scotland. This is generally done in vague 
terms l ike "maintaining jobs" or "adding 
financial muscle" but after the acquistion 
things look different, the Scottish lobby 
moves on to another i s s u e , and the 
acquirer has a re la t ive ly easy task in 
pursuing i t s own objectives. The prime 
example of this i s Guinness during i t s bid 
for D i s t i l l e r s . Guinness made a variety 
of promises concerning i t s corpora te 
headquar te rs and the appointment of 
Scottish d i rec to rs , most of which i t 
ult imately reneged on. Guinness's great 
mistake however, and why i t s broken 
promises caused such an uproar in 
Scot land, was t h a t i t made spec i f i c 
w r i t t e n p r o m i s e s t o the Sco t t i sh 
establishment as opposed to jus t the 
Scottish lobby. In particular the failure 
to go through with the appointment of Sir 
Thomas Risk as non-executive director 
caused more fuss than the failure to set-
up headquarters in Scotland for Guinness's 
whisky interests. 
Third, BP's claim i s vague. I t d-es not 
mention how many people wi l l move to 
Glasgow, or when. There is no discussion 
of the practicali t ies of creating a new BP 
outpost in Glasgow. For example, would 
BP keep B r i t o i l ' s rather fine, but no 
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doubt expensive, HQ building or move to 
smaller premises elsewhere? What would be 
the relationship between BP exploration in 
Scotland and the London based world-wide 
exploration team? Would there be prblems 
in integrating BP and Britoil exploration 
teams? 
Fourth, have BP considered the problems 
involved in actually getting staff to move 
up to Glasgow? Government policy in the 
1970's involved attempting to disperse 
civi l servants from London to Glasgow and 
o the r major UK c i t i e s . The pol icy 
foundered on the rock of staff resistance 
to such a move and l i t t l e dispersal has 
ever been achieved d e s p i t e the good 
economic ra t iona le for such a policy. 
More recently there i s the case of Shell 
Chemicals which planned to move i t s HQ frm 
London to rura l Chester. Shell managed 
the change even tua l ly but only by 
overcoming s t i f f res is tence from i t s 
employees many of whom lef t Shell rather 
than move from London. Could BP force i t s 
s taff to move? I t does not seem to have 
consulted i t s s taff on the move. (On 
Glasgow's unpopularity with managerial 
s t a f f in the south see I n s t i t u t e of 
Manpower Studies, 1987). 
Fif th, i t should not be forgotten tha t BP 
only r e c e n t l y moved i t s North Sea 
exploration HQ from Aberdeen to London. 
Presumably BP made t h i s move because i t 
conclded that the North Sea was no longer 
a major exploration area worthy of an 
independent exploration team. 
Could i t be tha t the claim to designate 
Glasgow as the new UK Exploration HQ is no 
more that a hastily conceived sop for the 
Scottish public to be repented at leisure. 
If the move made sense for BP a year ago 
why would i t want to reverse i t now? If 
BP does move, why Glasgow rather than 
Aberdeen, where both Br i to i l and BP have 
large operations servicing the North Sea? 
If BP does move to Glasgow, how long will 
i t stay? 
F i n a l l y , the BP proposal involves 
replacing the corporate HQ of a major 
British oil company with a subsidiary of a 
subsidiary of another major o i l company. 
Even i f BP i s able to sustain job numbers 
t h i s does not amount to replacing l ike 
wi th l i k e . In the o i l i ndus t ry in 
p a r t i c u l a r t he re i s a world of a 
difference between the headquarters of an 
independent international business and the 
UK subs id i a ry of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
exploration division of a major company. 
For example, as an independent business 
Britoil shows every likelihood of becoming 
an important force in the internat ional 
o i l industry. I t w i l l of course never be 
an Exxon or even a BP but i t can develop 
into an important competitive element in 
the o i l industry and help to ensure that 
the giants do not wholly dominate. In 
addition only as an independent company 
can Scotland bene f i t from B r i t o i l ' s 
continued development in the long term. 
If Britoil were to lose i t s independence, 
and i t s Glasgow base was turned into BP's 
exploration base for the UK, th i s would 
not give Scotland a long term benefit 
because BP would run this subsidiary down 
as i t s North Sea operations diminished. 
Given the fact that most commentators 
agree that the North Sea is currently past 
i t s peak in exploration and production 
terms a BP exploration base in Glasgow 
could turn out to be a very short- l ived 
development. 
Therefore, even i s we take BP's claim 
about the impact of the acquisi t ion of 
Britoil on jobs in Scotland at face value 
i t does not mean the Scottish dimension of 
the bid s i tua t ion should be forgotten. 
Such c la ims are always made in bid 
s i tua t ions par t icu lar ly when there i s a 
strong regional/national lobby to assuage. 
The very fact that (as in the Guinness 
case) they are made on the spur of the 
moment, without proper consideration of 
t h e p o s t - m e r g e r r e a l i t i e s of 
reorganisation, make them questionable. 
This i s not to say t h a t BP i s not 
currently sincere about i t s intentions; no 
doubt Guinness's intent ions were sincere 
as well . The fact i s however, tha t un t i l 
a merger i s consummated the acquiring 
company i t s e l f usually has no idea about 
how the two companies wi l l f i t together. 
Given the suddeness of BP's bid i t i s to 
be doubted that i t has so far seriously 
considered j u s t how to f i t the two 
companies together. When, in a post-
merger situation, BP executives, actually 
s i t down to cons ider the r e a l i t y of 
merging the two companies they may well 
come to very different conclusions about 
what i s a p p r o p r i a t e . At t h i s poin t 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e a l i t i e s have to be 
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considered, staff have to be consulted, or 
confronted, vague proposals have to be 
properly evaluated, and a l l t h i s i s in an 
industry where the external environment is 
particularly uncertain at the moment. I t 
may therefore be doubted i f BP's post-
merger views wi l l be the same as those 
stated in the heat of the pre-merger 
bat t le . 
The economic evidence on the effects of 
mergers in general 
Britain i s a merger intensive country -
quite unlike more successful economies 
like West Germany or Japan where takeover 
bids are relatively rare. In i tself this 
might not be very worrying - but when the 
evidence about the effects of mergers i s 
considered i t cer ta inly becomes a source 
of concern. 
The fact is that a considerable weight of 
academic evidence on the impact of mergers 
on the companies involved s t rong ly 
suggests that mergers do not produce any 
worthwhile bene f i t s for the acquired 
company or the acquiring company. I will 
r e s i s t the t empta t ion to l i s t these 
studies in fu l l and point instead to an 
excellent summary of the evidence in 
Malcolm Sawyer's book, "The Economics of 
Firms and Industr ies" (Croom-Helm, 1985) 
and to the most recent study by McKinsey & 
Co, which found that only 23% of 116 
mergers investigated by them in the Uk and 
the US could be considered successful -
and the larger the acquisit ion the l ess 
l ikely i t was to be successful in the 
sense of improving the acquired company's 
performance. The odds against a takeover 
producing a successful outcome are thus 
not very good - say one in five. 
The nature of the BP-Britoil proposed 
takeover creates additional worries in 
t h i s respect because BP i s a very large 
integrated, in ternat ional , oil company 
taking over what i s by o i l indus t ry 
standards a relatively small company. BP 
will easily dominate a merged company and 
will have no trouble in imposing i t s will . 
As argued above i t i s hard to see what 
posit ive things BP could do for Br i to i l 
(financially, or technically) so one must 
asume that BP wants Br i to i l to meet some 
s t ra teg ic or t a c t i c a l need (and one can 
imagine what these might be) and i t s 
dominance w i l l mean t he r e a re no 
r e s t r a i n t s on get t ing what i t wants. 
Since Br i to i l has nothing to gain from 
being acquired by BP (s t ra teg ica l ly or 
t ac t i ca l ly ) then from Br i to i l ' s point of 
view th is merger can never be successful 
although BP might well regard i t as a 
successful piece of opportunism if nothing 
else. 
The economic evidence on the effects of 
mergers on the Scottish economy 
A special study of the impact of the 
acquistion of Scottish companies by non-
Scottish companies was commissioned by the 
Scottish Office in 1983 and the report of 
the study published in April, 1987. The 
study t r i e d to c l a r i f y the var ious 
i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s t h a t an ex te rna l 
acquisi t ion could have on the acquired 
Scottish company in par t icular and the 
Scottish economy in general (See Ashcroft, 
Love and Scouller, 1987) 
To summarise i t s findings - the study 
found tha t many Scottish companies did 
bene f i t in seve ra l ways from being 
acquired whilst others did not, and that 
severa l S c o t t i s h companies had been 
positively harmed by takeover, for example 
by having major operations closed or 
ra t ional ised or t he i r commercial future jeopardised by misguided policies imposed 
by the acquirer. The study considered the 
factors which distinguished the mergers 
which were beneficial from the Scottish 
companies viewpoint from those that were 
not and came to the following important 
conclus ion. That the main fac to r 
distinguishing the two groups was that in 
the b e n e f i c i a l case the re had been 
something obvious that the acquirer could 
do for the Scottish business - say improve 
i t s technology, or i t s marketing, or i t s 
business strategy - whilst in the harmful 
cases there was nothing apparent that the 
acqu i re r could give to the acquired 
company and the acquisi t ion had been 
motivated purely by the s t ra teg ic or 
t a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the acqui r ing 
company. Since the BP-Br i to i l case 
appears to f i t this la t te r category rather 
well the findings of this Scottish Office 
report are very relevant and suggest that 
Br i to i l could be harmed as a resu l t of 
acquisition. 
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The study also examined the effects of 
acquist i ion on the wider economy apart 
from the benefits or harm to the immediate 
acquired firm. 
The study concluded tha t these wider 
effects were almost uniformly harmful to 
Scotland. In particular, the reduced use 
of l o c a l s e r v i c e s (banking, l e g a l , 
consultancy) was s igni f icant , as well as 
the reduced number of senior managerial 
positions available, and the reduction of 
important commercial functions carried out 
from Scotland such as R & D and marketing. 
Seventy-two per cent of the companies 
s t u d i e s reduced t h e i r use of loca l 
services and t h i s had implications for 
employment p rospec t s in the se rv i ce 
sector. 
The overall conclusion of the study was 
tha t there should be a presumption that 
the external acquis i t ion of a Scott ish 
company could be d e t r i m e n t a l to the 
company and to Scotland and tha t a priaa 
f a c i e case existed for referr ing any 
s ignif icant takeover bids to the MMC in 
order to a l low for these pos s ib l e 
detriments to be examined in detail before 
an acquis i t ion was made. For reasons 
explained above the Britoil bid i s a prime 
candidate for a reference of this type. 
Britoil 's position 
I t has to be remembered tha t i t i s not 
part of the duties of Britoil 's directors 
to ensure tha t Br i to i l stays independent 
and in Scotland. In a bid s i tua t ion the 
duty of the d i rec tors i s to evaluate 
whether the bid r e p r e s e n t s a t rue 
reflection of the company's potential and 
ultimately to ensure that the shareholders 
get the best deal possible which generally 
means the highest price. 
I t i s not surprising then that Britoil has 
not made use of i t s Scot t ish base as part 
of i t s o v e r a l l defence because i t s 
sha reho lde r s are not i n t e r e s t e d in 
geography but money. What i s somewhat 
disturbing i s that B r i t o i l have made no 
attempt to confirm i t s Scottish identity 
by holding i t s board meetings on the bid 
in Glasgow. Even B r i t o i l ' s shareholders 
might wonder why, after spending over £50m 
on a luxurious new office complex, the 
Br i to i l board cannot make use of i t for 
i t s meetings. 
Some aspects of B r i t o i l ' s defence have 
been equally d i f f i c u l t to fathom. Two 
days af te r BP's i n i t i a l raid on B r i t o i l ' s 
shares Br i to i l announced a proposed deal 
with the American Oil company Atlant ic 
Richfield (ARCO) which involved the swap 
of At lant ic ' s non-American oi l and gas 
assets in return for newly issued Britoil 
shares, giving Atlantic just under 50$ of 
Britoil 's aquity. This may well have been 
something the two companies had been 
considering before the BP raid but i t 
cer ta inly was not presented as such and 
therefore i t took on the appearance of a 
hastily conceived attempt to frighten off 
BP. Unfortunately the proposal lacked 
conviction. I t was not at a l l clear what 
was in i t for B r i t o i l ' s sha reho lders 
compared with the clear gains involved in 
the BP b id . Nor was the commercial 
ra t ionale of the proposal a t a l l c lear . 
Would Atlantic real ly have been prepared 
to own half of Br i to i l without effective 
c o n t r o l ? Nor was i t c l e a r t h a t the 
government would contemplate the further 
encroachment of American oil companies on 
Br i ta in ' s o i l industry. However, what 
finally put paid to this defence was that 
A t l a n t i c muddied t h e w a t e r s by 
idependent ly bu i ld ing up a s take in 
Britoil which made i t look at one time as 
i f i t might make a conventional takeover 
bid for B r i t o i l t o r i v a l t h a t of BP. 
Atlantic quickly real ised that i t could 
not afford to compete with BP and instead 
sold i t s stake to BP. 
B r i t o i l ' s current defence, based on an 
independent evaluation of i t s undeveloped 
assets, i s that i t i s worth significantly 
more (at £7 a share) than BPs in i t ia l bid 
(£4.50) and t h i s has forced BP to ra ise 
i t s bid to £5 per share a t which price i t 
seems to have successfully flushed out the 
Atlantic Richfield holding. If t h i s i s 
the case BP a l ready has over 50? of 
Br i to i l in i t s pocket and wi l l soon be 
able to declare the bid unconditional. As 
£5 a share represents an attractive price 
to most Br i to i l shareholders BP should 
then have l i t t l e trouble obtaining the 
remaining Britoil shares. 
Br i to i l appears to have recognised th i s 
r ea l i t y and are now apparently seeking 
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what i s known colloquial ly as a White 
Knight. That i s , another bidder, prepared 
to pay more for Br i to i l than BP, and 
prepared to give Britoil a greater degree 
of independence. The one company Britoil 
seems to have in mind i s Bri t ish Gas but 
for various reasons t h i s appears to be a 
vain hope. Bri t ish Gas i s already the 
subject of a MMC investigation into gas 
prices and the government could hardly 
allow British Gas to increase i t s monopoly 
position in gas under these circumstances. 
In addition, even a company as financially 
healthy as British Gas is unlikely to want 
to bid against BP especially since British 
Gas currently has no stake in Britoil and 
would have to build one from scratch 
paying well above the price a t which BP 
built i t s stake. British Gas must also be 
aware that BP i s not going to walk away 
from th is f ight . Br i to i l 1 s search for a 
White Knight i s thus doomed. 
Conclusions 
One of Scotland's major companies, set up 
to give Scotland the impression that i t 
would have a long-term benefit from North 
Sea Oil, i s about to go the way of most 
independent Scottish businesses. That i s , 
south. 
Scotland cannot depend on anyone to 
prevent this. The Britoil board may fight 
the bid but not out of any sentiment for 
Scotland. The board's responsibi l i ty i s 
to i t s shareholders not to Scotland's 
economic identity. Britoil 's shareholders 
won't prevent i t . They wi l l be happy to 
se l l out to the highest bidder and take 
the i r capital gains. The much vaunted 
golden share won't prevent i t because the 
government seems unprepared to get into a 
t r ia l of strength with BP and once BP owns 
Br i to i l company law wi l l be on i t s side, 
not the governments. Finally, i t does not 
look a t present as i f the government i s 
prepared to "save" Br i to i l for Scotland. 
Mr Rifkind, despite his fine words at the 
opening of Britoil 's headquarters, appears 
to be doing l i t t l e to ensure independence. 
Mr Parkinson, the Energy Secretary, whose 
responsibilities include the North Sea and 
the o i l industry, has had nothing to say 
about BP's p l ans . Mr Lawson, the 
Chancellor, who privatised Britoil when he 
was Energy Secretary, and who i s the 
person who would be r e spons ib le for 
wielding the government's golden share, 
has also been s i l en t on the issue. The 
issue e i ther i s an embarassment for the 
government or a bore. One can only be 
certain that the Scottish dimension of the 
issue is not one which will unduly concern 
the present government, 
I f Scotland wants to keep i t s major 
independent business then Scotland wi l l 
have to do i t on i t s own. At the very 
least by kicking up enough fuss to ensure 
a reference to the Monopolies Commission 
so tha t an independent assessment of the 
merger is undertaken. I t may well be that 
the merger does make sense for Britain and 
that the loss of Britoil will do Scotland 
no g r e a t harm u l t i m a t e l y . If the 
Monopolies Commission came to t h i s 
conclusion after due consideration of the 
facts, so be i t . But Scotland must ensure 
tha t such an invest igat ion takes place 
before i t takes t h i s merger lying down. 
Otherwise proneness may become our 
permanent position. 
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Highland Dist i l ler ies (1980): Against 
" . . . the e f f i c i ency of the Highland 
business would be adversely affectd by the 
merger" 
" . . . The merger i s l i k e l y to have an 
adverse effect on the l imited career 
opportunities in Scotland" 
"... t h e r e could a t some t ime be a 
conflict of interest between the promotion 
of the * Famous Grousex brand and the 
exis t ing products of Hiram Walker (the 
proposed acquirer). . ." 
"Hiram Walker has many [products] that at 
some time in the future may appear to 
offer a be t t e r return on investment than 
Scottish Whisky." (which may detract from 
the investment in Highland) 
Royal Bank (1982): Against 
"We believe tha t an important factor in 
Scotland's economic difficult ies has been 
the progressive l o s s of morale which the 
takeover of large companies has caused; 
and we accept tha t t h i s i s damaging to 
Scotland. Entrepreneurial s p i r i t and 
business leadership depend cr i t ical ly on 
self-confidence, and on balance we believe 
t h a t such s e l f - con f idence has been 
weakened." 
the effect of the merger on, "...career 
p r o s p e c t s , i n i t i a t i v e and bus iness 
enterprise in Scotland woul be damaged to 
the public interest in the UK as a whole." 
"The damage would not be confined to the 
Royal Bank Group or to the f inancial 
sector in Edinburgh. Loss of Scott ish 
c o n t r o l of RBSG would be seen as a 
s igni f icant step in the long process of 
cen t ra l i sa t ion and of weakening local 
control over local economic a f f a i r s . I t 
would reinforce the impresssion of a 
"branch economy" and diminish confidence 
and morale in Scottish business." 
" I t would, by reducing the number of key 
independent positions in Edinburgh weaken 
public l i f e and leadership in the city and 
country." 
Anderson-Strathclyde (1982): Against 
" I t i s possible that there wil l be a loss 
of morale and motivation amongst the 
present executive d i rec to rs and senior 
management suff ic ient to have an adverse 
affect on the company's performance." 
"...but we consider tha t adverse effects 
upon the region are to be expected from 
the change of s t a tus from an independent 
to a subsidiary company..." 
"The loss of employment would not be large 
but would nevertheless involve a category 
of employment with which Scotland i s none 
too well endowed." 
Suits (1979): Not Against 
"We accept i t i s Lonrho's intent ion that 
Suits should be a largely autonomous 
Scottish subsidiary operating broadly as 
i t does now." 
"We do not think therefore that the scope 
for management of Suits in Scotland would 
be materially affected by the merger." 
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